Page 24 - Latinaero_magazine_issue_05_oct_nov_dec-2012

ANIVERSÁR IO
24 Latin aero magazine Número 5 - 2012
› NTSC report on SSJ 100 RA-97004
crash in Java on 9 May 2012
A Sukhoi RRJ-95B aircraft, registered 97004, with a flight number RA
36801 on 9 May 2012 was conducting a demonstration flight from Halim
Perdanakusuma International Airport, Jakarta. The accident flight was
the second of the two scheduled demonstration flights.
Occupants of the flight were 45 persons consisted of two pilots, one navi-
gator, one test flight engineer, and 41 passengers. The passengers consis-
ted of 4 Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Company (SCAC) personnel, one engine ma-
nufacturer (SNECMA) personnel, and 36 invited passengers (including 34
Indonesian, one American and one French nationality).
The flight was planned under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) at an alti-
tude of 10,000 feet and the estimated elapsed time was 30 minutes with
total fuel endurance of 4 hours. The area for the demonstration flight
was planned over “Bogor” Area however the pilot might assume that
the flight was approved to 20 Nm on radial 200 HLM VOR. The available
charts on board the aircraft did not contain information relating to the
“Bogor” Area and the nearby terrain. The Pilot In Command acted as pilot
flying while the Second In Command acted as pilot monitoring during
this flight. A representative of potential customer sat on the observer
seat ( jump seat) in the cockpit.
At 0720 UTC (1420 LT), the flight took off from runway 06 then turned
right to intercept 200 radial from HLM VOR and climb to 10,000 feet.
At 0724 UTC (1424 LT), the pilot contacted Jakarta Approach controller
and informed that the flight was established on 200 radial HLM VOR and
reached 10,000 feet.
At 0726 UTC (1426 LT), the pilot contacted Jakarta Approach controller
and requested for descent to 6,000 feet and subsequently requested to
make a right orbit and was approved by Jakarta Approach controller.
At 0732:26 UTC (1432:26 LT - time based on Flight Data Recorder/FDR) the
aircraft impacted a ridge of Mount Salak on 28 Nm HLM VOR on radial 198
at coordinate 06°42’45”S 106°44’05”E, approximately 6,000 feet ASL. 38
seconds prior to impact, the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)
audio warning “TERRAIN AHEAD, PULL UP” activated once and “AVOID
TERRAIN” activated 6 times. The PIC inhibited the TAWS system assuming
that the warning was a problem on the database. Seven seconds prior to
impact, the flight warning system “LANDING GEAR NOT DOWN” activated.
At 0750 UTC (1450 LT), the Jakarta Approach controller on duty noticed
that the flight target was gone on the radar monitor. There was no alert
on the Jakarta Radar system prior to the disappearance of the target.
On 10 May 2012, the location of the aircraft was identified by the Search
and Rescue helicopter pilot. All occupants were fatally injured and air-
craft was destroyed. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was found on 15
May 2012. The memory module was in good condition and contained
2 hours of good quality recording. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) was
found on 31 May 2012. It contained 471 parameters of 150 hours recor-
ding time. Both recorders were downloaded in the NTSC facility by the
NTSC experts and were assisted by the Russian experts. A simulation test
suggested that a recovery action might have avoided the collision with
terrain up to 24 seconds after the first TAWS warning.
Jakarta Radar Services had not established a minimum altitude for vec-
toring aircraft for certain areas and the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
(MSAW) did not provide warnings to the Jakarta Approach controller be-
fore the aircraft impacted.
The investigation concluded that the factors contributing to this accident
were:
a. The crew were not aware of the mountainous area surrounding the
flight path due to various factors resulting in disregarding the TAWS
warning.
b. The Jakarta Radar service had not established the minimum vec-
toring altitudes and the system was not equipped with functioning
MSAW for the particular area surrounding Mount Salak.
c. Distraction to the flight crew from prolonged conversation not re-
lated to the progress of the flight resulted in the pilot flying did not
continue to change the aircraft heading while in orbit. Consequently,
the aircraft unintentionally exited the orbit.
Following this investigation the Indonesia Directorate General of Civil
Aviation, PT. Angkasa Pura II and the Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Company have
performed several safety actions.
The NTSC issued Immediate Recommendation and several Safety Recom-
mendations to the Indonesia Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA),
Soekarno-Hatta International Airport International Airport, Department
of Aviation Industry – the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Russia and
Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Company of Russian Federation. u
© H. Cariou - 2011
relatório oficial – official report